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We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of time-
inconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that dele-
gation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. In a model where
delegation and speciﬁc policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown
that McCallum’s conjecture holds if optimal ex-ante policies are ﬁxed. However, with a
ﬂexibility-credibility trade-oﬀ delegation is both desirable and improves credibility. While
delegation does not increase commitment per se it makes it more attractive and increases
investments in credibility. Delegation can therefore serve as a valid commitment device.
JEL classiﬁcation: D02, D23, D73, H11
Keywords: Time-inconsistency, commitment, delegation
∗Postal Address: Alfred-Weber-Institute, Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Str.
20, D-69115 Heidelberg, Germany, perino@uni-hd.de, tel.: +49 6221 54 8014, fax: +49 6221 54 8020
11 Introduction
Delegation is a commonly used instrument to achieve governmental commitment in situations
where time-inconsistency constrains economic policies.1 However, the credibility of delegation
itself has been challenged. McCallum (1995, 1997) conjectures in his ’second fallacy’ that dele-
gation merely relocates the commitment problem, but does not solve it. A government that is
unable to commit on speciﬁc policies lacks the ability to commit on institutional arrangements
such as delegation. Analogously, if the government is able to credibly delegate, why not use the
same mechanism to induce credibility into the desired policy in the ﬁrst place.
Most papers that use delegation as a commitment device do not address this issue but assume
that delegation is credible (Levine et al. 2005, Roelfsema 2007, Alesina and Tabellini 2007, 2008,
Ludema and Olofsgard 2008). Exceptions are Lohmann (1992), Jensen (1997), Moser (1999) and
Keefer and Stasavage (2003). In Jensen (1997) tit-for-tat strategies induce commitment. He ﬁnds
that delegation has no eﬀect unless it is costlier to override a bureaucrat’s decision than to renege
in case of discretion. In line with McCallum’s ’second fallacy’ delegation dominates discretion
only if commitment technologies diﬀer. Moser (1999) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) ﬁnd
that delegation improves commitment if there are heterogeneous veto players. This qualiﬁes
McCallum’s conjecture for a speciﬁc internal structure of the government. Lohmann (1992)
is closest to the present paper since she considers symmetric commitment technologies with
an endogenous level of commitment. However, she does not explicitly solve the model with
discretion and does not compare commitment levels of the two scenarios.
This paper builds on McCallum’s critique by assuming that both delegation and speciﬁc
policies are subject to the same endogenous commitment technology. It is shown that McCal-
lum’s conjecture holds in a simple time-inconsistency problem when the ex-ante optimal policy
is ﬁxed. The main contribution, however, is that delegation is desirable and unambiguously
increases credibility if the optimal ex-ante policy is uncertain. In this case there is a ﬂexibility-
credibility trade-oﬀ since there are reasons other than time-inconsistency to adjust the pol-
icy ex-post. Delegation relaxes this trade-oﬀ and thereby makes commitment more attractive.
While delegation does not improve commitment per se, it increases its marginal productivity
and, hence, investments in credibility.
The link between increased commitment and delegation is illustrated in a simple investment
game. However, the same reasoning applies to similar time-inconsistency problems in other
1See Rogoﬀ (1985), Lohmann (1992), Levine et al. (2005), Roelfsema (2007), Alesina and Tabellini (2008) and
Ludema and Olofsgard (2008).
2areas of economic policy such as monetary policy, utility regulation and environmental policy.
2 The Model
2.1 The time-inconsistency problem
Consider a project, such as a technological innovation or a major construction work, that if
successfully executed (i.e. the new technological solution is found or the construction completed
on time and satisfying all safety rules etc.) yields a public beneﬁt B. The ﬁrm that secures the
mandate to undertake the project is paid an amount T upon successful completion. The ﬁrm’s
proﬁts are given by
π(x,T) = ρ(x)T − x, (1)
where x is the amount of eﬀort dedicated to the project by the ﬁrm and ρ ∈ [0,1] (with ρ0 > 0
and ρ00 < 0) is the probability that the project is successfully completed.
The government has the following objective function
G = ρ(x)[B − λT] − x, (2)
where λ > 0 is the marginal cost of public funds. It faces the following time-inconsistency
problem. When the government commissions the project it is willing to promise to pay a









However, once the project is completed it prefers to refuse payment (Tpost = 0), e.g. by claiming
that completion was not ’successful’ or by openly reneging on the previous agreement.
Governments face an inherent diﬃculty to commit. Since, by deﬁnition, they have unrivaled
authority, forcing them to stick to their promises is much more diﬃcult than in cases where only
private parties are involved (Acemoglu 2003). How a government can commit itself is discussed
in the following section.
2.2 Endogenous commitment
Time-inconsistency can be resolved if the government is able to commit. To do so it has to
impose costs on any future deviation from the agreement with the ﬁrm. This can be achieved
by formally codifying it into law. This involves costs c ∈ [o,∞) that are assumed to be en-
dogenous (see e.g. Lohmann (1992)) since there are diﬀerent levels and procedures available for
3codiﬁcation, e.g. administrative procedures, laws, constitutional amendments and involvement
of diﬀerent chambers etc. Codiﬁcation induces credibility since in order to renege on it ex-post,
the government has to change the respective law or the constitution - which again is costly. For
simplicity it is assumed that the costs of ex-post adjustments are exactly the same as the ones
incurred when the agreement is codiﬁed. Hence, if the government reneges ex-post it has to pay
c twice.
The government is constrained to follow the formal procedures of the legislating process.
This, however, does not impose further restrictions on the policies or institutions it establishes
or abolishes. Moreover, the available procedures of the legislating process are exactly the same
regardless of what is actually codiﬁed. This ﬁts McCallum’s assumption that both speciﬁc
policies and institutional arrangements such as delegation are subject to the same commitment
technology.
With this endogenous commitment option the ex-ante objective function of the government
becomes
G = ρ(x)[B − λT] − x − c. (4)
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the government sets c and T. Thereafter, the ﬁrm
exerts eﬀort x and ﬁnally the government decides whether to renege on the agreement or not.
The government pays only if this is less costly than reneging on the original promise, i.e. if
λT ≤ c. (5)
Hence, the ﬁrm invests only if the promis is credible. In this case, eﬀort increases in T.
In the ﬁrst stage, the government chooses c and T such that the credibility constraint (5)
is binding, i.e. T = c
λ. Otherwise (4) is strictly decreasing in c and it is therefore optimal to













− 1 = 0, (6)
therefore determines the optimal c∗(B) and hence T∗(B) under endogenous commitment. Note
that T∗(B) is strictly smaller than Tante(B) since the necessity to commit increases the marginal
cost of raising T.
2.3 Uncertainty
Now assume that the value of the project B is uncertain ex-ante. The actual beneﬁt realized
ex-post is B = b +  where  is normally distributed with zero mean, variance σ > 0 and
4density φ(). The government learns the true value only once the project is completed but the
ﬁrm is assumed to know  before it decides on eﬀort. The real value of B is irrelevant for the
government’s reneging and the ﬁrm’s investment decision. The equilibrium policy of the game
with uncertainty is therefore (c∗(b),T∗(b)). Since the optimal ex-ante policy is a function of B
the government would be better oﬀ if it could adjust T∗(b) ex-post to T∗(B). However, unless
the government is able to write contingent laws (which is ruled out here), time-inconsistency
renders this type of ex-post adjustment infeasible.
3 Delegation
Now the government has the option to delegate the decision of how much to pay to the ﬁrm to
a bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is not prone to time-inconsistency. He therefore takes the ﬁrm’s
investment decision into account even if he decides ex-post. While the bureaucrat’s incentives are
perfectly in line with the ex-ante preferences of the government, the bureaucrat might not fully
take exogenous shocks into account. His perception of the shock might be somewhat dampened
(here this has the same eﬀect as partial capture of the bureaucrat by the ﬁrm). Assume the
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where g(a) is strictly positive, strictly increasing for all a < 0 and strictly decreasing for all a > 0
with a unique maximum at a = 0. β ∈ [0,1] indicates the responsiveness of the bureaucrat to
shocks. The bureaucrat does not like to be overridden by the government.
The timing of the game with delegation is as follows: First, the government sets and pays
c and delegates the decision. Second, the ﬁrm chooses eﬀort knowing  and β. Next, the
bureaucrat decides on TB and in the last stage the government can override the bureaucrat’s
decision by again paying c.
The last stage is equivalent to the game with discretion. The credibility constraint is TB ≤ c
λ.
The bureaucrat therefore chooses TB(c,) = min

Tante(b + β), c
λ

. Hence, if the shock  is
suﬃciently negative, i.e.  ≤ ¯ (c,β) < 0 with Tante(b+β¯ (β)) = c
λ, the bureaucrat will choose a
payment below the credibility constraint. This is beneﬁcial since these are cases when the project
is of low value and an average reward would induce over-investment. Delegation therefore
increases ﬂexibility without a negative eﬀect on credibility. If β = 0, i.e. if the bureaucrat
completely ignores shock , this eﬀect vanishes and delegation perfectly mimics discretion.
5The ﬁrm anticipates the bureaucrat’s decision and maximizes
π(x,TB) = ρ(x)TB(c,) − x. (8)


































de − c. (9)
Note that for all  < − b
β the bureaucrat’s payment is zero and hence the ﬁrm does not exert
any eﬀort.
Proposition 1 The government prefers to delegate the payment decision if the value of the
project is uncertain ex-ante and the bureaucrat at least somewhat responsive to the exogenous
shock (i.e. β > 0).
Proof: See appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is that the additional ﬂexibility delegation provides avoids
excessive spendings on projects of little or even negative public value. In contrast to the uni-
form payment under discretionary policy-making delegation to a bureaucrat allows for some
adjustment to exogenous shocks. Bureaucrats are therefore of value if they are able to react to
contingencies that can not be codiﬁed into law, either because it is too costly or because they
can not be veriﬁed.
The key result, however, concerns the degree of commitment the government chooses under
diﬀerent institutional arrangements. The optimal cDel(b,β) is determined by the ﬁrst order















de − 1 = 0. (10)
Proposition 2 The government chooses a higher level of commitment when it delegates (cDel(b,β) >
c∗(b)) if the value of the project is uncertain ex-ante and the bureaucrat at least somewhat re-
sponsive to the exogenous shock (i.e. β > 0).
Proof: See appendix.
The ﬁrst insight of this result is that McCallum had a point. If the ex-ante optimal policy
is ﬁxed or the bureaucrat’s decision inert to shocks, delegation is perfectly equivalent to discre-
tion if both are subject to the same commitment technology. However, if there is uncertainty
6that creates reasons to adjust the policy ex-post other than time-inconsistency, then delegation
is both beneﬁcial (Proposition 1) and induces higher commitment (Proposition 2). Delega-
tion provides ﬂexibility that does not hamper government’s credibility. It relaxes the trade-oﬀ
between credibility and ﬂexibility and thereby induces higher commitment by the government.
3.1 Costly delegation
So far delegation was for free. However, granting discretionary scope to a bureaucrat is likely
to be associated with additional costs, e.g. paying skill premiums and more sophisticated hiring
processes. This gives rise to an extra cost of delegation.
Proposition 1 is qualiﬁed if delegation is associated with additional costs. In this case, the
beneﬁts of delegation are weighted against its costs. However, commitment is strictly higher if
the government delegates even if delegation is costly. Given that the commitment technologies
remain the same for delegation and speciﬁc policies, additional costs of delegation do not aﬀect
the incentives to invest in credibility.
3.2 Endogenous choice of bureaucrat’s type
If the sovereign can choose the type β of a bureaucrat by a screening mechanism or if complete
contracts are available, she would always prefer ’perfect’ delegation (β = 1). An improved match
between the government’s and bureaucrat’s preferences has three beneﬁcial eﬀects: no projects
of negative value are ﬁnanced, payments are reduced in response to small negative shocks and
thereby it becomes optimal to increase the maximum credible payment which increases the
probability that high value projects are successfully completed.
4 Conclusion
While delegation is regarded an eﬀective commitment device the validity of this claim has
hardly ever been checked. Inspired by McCallum’s critique this paper assumes that there is no
inherent commitment advantage to delegation. A government can commit to speciﬁc policies as
well as to delegation using the same commitment technology. The ﬁrst result is that for ﬁxed
ex-ante optimal policies McCallum’s ’second fallacy’ holds. Delegation does neither improve
commitment nor government’s payoﬀ.
However, if there is uncertainty that aﬀects the optimal ex-ante policy and hence creates
reasons for ex-post adjustment other than time-inconsistency, delegation can improve both gov-
ernment’s payoﬀ and credibility. Delegation of the policy task to a bureaucrat who is not prone
7to time-inconsistency but at least somewhat responsive to the resolution of uncertainty adds
ﬂexibility to the policy decision that does not interfere with credibility. While delegation does
not improve commitment per se it makes it more attractive and hence increases investments in
credibility.
This result contributes to the explanation of observed correlations between delegation and
credibility in economic policy (Berger et al. 2001). Delegation is a valid commitment device
in situations where policy-makers face a ﬂexibility-credibility trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, this
justiﬁes the use of delegation to improve credibility of policies in a number of relevant situations.
On the other hand, in the absence of a ﬂexibility-credibility trade-oﬀ the necessity remains to
justify why delegation indeed improves commitment.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
If there is no uncertainty, the government’s optimization problems with and without delegation
are equivalent since in both cases the credibility constraint is always binding. The same holds,
if the bureaucrat does not update his information on the project value (β = 0) since Tante(b) >
c
λ and hence TB(0) = c
λ. Hence, without uncertainty or with a non-responsive bureaucrat,
delegation and discretion are equivalent.


































de is negative since the project
value is strictly negative in these cases. Hence, if the shocks are in the range [−∞,− b
β] delegation

































since Tante(b + ) < TB(c,) < c
λ. For all shocks [¯ ,+∞] both institutional arrangements
are equivalent. Hence, government’s expected payoﬀ is strictly higher under delegation with
uncertainty and β > 0. 
8A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Note that Tante(b) (see (3)) implies
ρ0 ∂x
∂T




Since ¯  is deﬁned as Tante(b + β¯ ) = c





















































This implies that cDel(b,β) > c∗(b) for all β ∈ (0,1]. 
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